WASHINGTON DC – What we call the war on terror, al Qaeda and its affiliates could term the war on critical infrastructure. They have demonstrated an ability to use buildings, materials and operations that society relies on every day as weapons of mass destruction or disruption. We cannot just rely on defeating terrorists “over there,” but must also increase national preparedness and decrease vulnerability here at home. By this measure, the terrorists are not winning, but neither are we.

The next major terrorist attack in the United States ? and make no mistake, given the open nature of our society, there will almost certainly be one within the next 5-10 years ? could very easily be directed against entities that manufacture, refine, repackage, transport or use significant amounts of petrochemicals or chemicals.

Almost five years after September 11, the chemical sector is not as secure as it could be ? or needs to be. For that reason, the Bush administration is promoting legislation that will give the Department of Homeland Security the authority to set clear national chemical security standards, and strengthen outside oversight and enforcement. Many within the chemical industry, including the American Chemistry Council, endorse such an approach. Congress is considering several pieces of legislation to accomplish this.

While a step in the right direction, the emphasis is on risk management, making potential targets more difficult to attack, rather than risk elimination, taking facilities completely off the terrorism target list. A proper role for the federal government is not just to set appropriate standards (and mandates if voluntary measures fall short) to combat terrorism risk. It is to provide a range of incentives to get the private sector to incorporate inherently safer materials, procedures and other changes to its operations.

The Threat

While we are in many respects more secure than on September 11, a long-term terrorism threat to the United States remains, but is changing in significant ways that directly impacts critical infrastructure security.

The 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan eliminated al Qaeda headquarters and primary training ground. Osama bin Laden is no longer the commander of a ?standing army.? However, he remains a source of inspiration for a global movement that incorporates a variety of extremist organizations motivated primarily by local grievances.

The most recent major terrorist attacks against civilian infrastructure bear this out. The commuter train bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and twin subway bombings in London in July 2005 both involved home-grown plots with minimal outside assistance. These ?self-starters,? while perhaps less lethal, will be difficult for police and intelligence officials to detect in advance.

The next attack may not involve international icons like the World Trade Towers or Pentagon, but mundane, accessible targets that exist in every state. The perpetrators may not be jihadists who infiltrate our porous borders, but disaffected individuals who already live here, have no prior links to terrorism networks and are socially alienated. Such radicalization could occur within our existing prison population, for example. We know based on the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City that there is a secular domestic terrorism threat as well.

The Risk

The war on terror, or ?long war? as the Pentagon now calls it, is a come-as-you-are conflict. Since terrorism is a tactic rather than a specific adversary, it cannot be restricted to a specific battlefield such as Iraq. An effective strategy to combat terrorism requires a range of actions. The Bush administration?s latest national security strategy, released in March of this year, lists three homeland security priorities:

Preventing terrorist attacks within the United States

Reducing America?s vulnerability to terrorism

Minimizing the damage and facilitating the recovery from attacks that do occur

To date, prevention has centered on better physical security. Many chemical facility operators are taking concrete steps, but far from all. Little has been done to reduce the sector?s vulnerability to terrorism. Oddly, Michael Chertoff, the Secretary of the Department Homeland Security, views approaches like inherent risk reduction as ?mission creep.?

?Clearly a lot of chemical companies on their own, in meeting performance standards, will want to look at inherently safer technology,? Chertoff recently told the National Chemical Security Forum. ?But we have to be careful not to move from what is a security-based focus, as part of the type of regulation I?m describing, into one that tries to broaden into achieving environmental ends that are unrelated to security.?

But the security dilemma is that, on their own, facilities that manufacture or use the most hazardous chemicals ? perhaps as few as 20 that terrorists could actually exploit, putting significant numbers of people at risk ? are not moving fast enough to adopt safer alternatives that have been proven to be effective and economical.

The Industry Response

A recent survey of some 1,800 chemical facilities deregistered from the Environmental Protection Agency?s Risk Management Planning (RMP) program, undertaken by the Center for American Progress, reveals both good and bad news regarding chemical critical infrastructure security. Facilities are selectively adapting their operations, but the pace of change is too slow.

The survey identified 284 facilities in 47 states that switched to less acutely hazardous chemical or processes, or moved to safer locations that significantly reduce the risk to the surrounding population. Seventy-two percent of the facilities that changed their operations were drinking water and wastewater plants. Most transitioned from the use of chlorine gas to liquid bleach (sodium hypochlorite). A few even generate the bleach on-site, eliminating broader manufacturing, storage and transportation concerns. Others shifted to ultraviolet light, which is also effective against natural or biological hazards, including anthrax.

Manufacturing plants reporting process changes involving cleaning products, paper, glass, circuit boards, food products, metal products and chemicals. Other applications included electric power production, oil refineries, hazardous waste, agricultural ammonia and swimming pool service.

A sampling of the compounds involved included shifts from gaseous to liquid ammonia; oleum to sulfur trioxide (using just-in-time manufacturing); chlorine gas to sodium hyposulfate and hydrogen peroxide; anhydrous ammonia gas to natural gas or granular fertilizer; chlorine gas to sodium chlorate; anhydrous sulfur dioxide to sodium bisulfite; chlorine gas to solid magnesium chloride salt injected with nitrogen gas; anhydrous to aqueous ammonia; anhydrous sulfur dioxide to solid sulfur dioxide or sodium metabisulfite and bleach; and hydrofluoric acid to solid acid catalysts.

Companies and municipalities mentioned improved security, safety and legal or regulatory requirements as the impetus for change. Some anticipated these changes could result in cost savings or increased profitability. Respondents listed many areas where expenses would be reduced or avoided.

In addition, 69 percent of the survey respondents provided information on conversion costs. A substantial majority reported that switching to inherently safer materials or processes could be accomplished for less than $1 million, most of those under $100,000. In cases where costs were significantly higher, the conversion usually included major facility upgrades.

Of the 284 facilities identified as switching to safer alternatives, only 44 were among the highest risk facilities, those with at least 100,000 people in the surrounding area. This represents only 10 percent of the